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Abstract

Understanding Dynamic Capabilities
Sidney G. Winter
The Wharton School
Defining ordinary or “zero- level” capabilities as those that permit a firm to “make a
living” in the short term, one can define dynamic capabilities as those that operate to extend,
modify or create ordinary capabilities. Logically, one can then proceed to elaborate a hierarchy
of higher-order capabilities (Collis 1994). However, it is argued here that the strategic substance
of capabilities involves patterning of activity, and that costly investments are typically required
to create and sustain such patterning – for example, in product development. Firms can
accomplish change without reliance on dynamic capability, by means here termed “ad hoc
problem solving.” Whether higher order capabilities are created or not depends on the costs and
benefits of the investments relative to ad hoc problem solving, and so does the “level of the
game” at whic h strategic competition effectively occurs.
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Understanding Dynamic Capabilities
Sidney G. Winter
The Wharton School

Many strategy scholars remain skeptical about the value of the concept of “dynamic
capabilities.” While some see dynamic capabilities as the key to competitive advantage (Teece,
Pisano and Shuen 1997), others seem to doubt that there actually are such things. Still others
believe that they exist, but suspect that they are “born not made” – i.e., they doubt that deliberate
efforts to strengthen such capabilities are a genuine option for managers. And some believe that
while they are a genuine option, they are not necessarily something that confers competitive
advantage. This note seeks to reduce the mystery surrounding both the terminology and the
phenomenon. It identifies some key issues and argues that clarity is served by keeping these
issues distinct. As regards terminology, it offers a proposal that seems constructive – but of
course will really prove to be so only if it is widely adopted.
Routines and capabilities. Following my own proposal (Winter 2000), I begin by
founding the concept of organizational capability on the broader concept of organizational
routine: An organizational capability is a high level routine (or collection of routines) that,
together with its implementing input flows, confers upon an organization’s management a set of
decision options for producing significant outputs of a particular type. For present purposes, the
points deserving emphasis here are the connotations of “routine” – behavior that is learned,
highly patterned, repetitious or quasi-repetitious, founded in part in tacit knowledge – and the
specificity of objectives. Brilliant improvisation is not a routine, and there is no such thing as a
general-purpose routine.

“Dynamic” connotes change. There is a broad consensus in the literature that “dynamic
capabilities” contrast with ordinary (or “operational”) capabilities by being concerned with
change. Collis (1994) is particularly explicit and formal in making the point that dynamic
capabilities govern the rate of change of ordinary capabilities. Following the example of the
differential calculus, he points to the existence of second order, third order, etc. dynamic
capabilities and explicitly makes the extension “ad infinitum.” This terminological approach is
adopted here, but with an important caveat as to whether higher order capabilities “exist” in an
interesting sense. From a logical point of view, the “existence” of higher order rates of change is
in question only in the mathematical sense that some derivatives might not exist; and from a
computational point of view, a time sequence of N+1 values of a variable suffices to compute
one value of the Nth order rate of change. But if dynamic capabilities are similar to capabilities
in that they involve patterned activity oriented to relatively specific objectives, then there is no
guarantee that the organizational processes governing high order change are highly patterned,
and substantial reason to think otherwise. In this important substantive sense, high order
dynamic capabilities do not necessarily exist. This point is pursued below.
The “zero level” in the capability hierarchy. Constants and technical issues aside,
everything is the derivative of its integral and the integral of its derivative. To make effective
use of the concept of a hierarchy of rates of change, we need a convention to identify the “zero
level,” the analogue of position for variables moving in space. Because capabilities are complex,
structured and multi-dimensional, this question may not have an answer that seems both clear
and compelling in all cases. There is, however, a heuristic guide available that conforms to
common sense and existing practice, at least for the capabilities of firms competing in markets.
Consider a hypothetical firm “in equilibrium”, an organization that keeps earning its living by
producing and selling the same product, on the same scale and to the same customer population
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over time. The capabilities exercised in that stationary process are the zero level capabilities, the
“how we earn a living now” capabilities. Without them, the firm could not collect the revenue
from its customers that allows it to buy more inputs and do the whole thing over again. By
contrast, capabilities that would change the product, the production process, the scale or the
customers (markets) served are not at the zero level. New product development, as practiced in
many firms, is a prototypical example of a first order “dynamic capability”. The capabilities that
support the creation of new outlets by McDonalds or Starbucks are another prototypical example,
focused on the domain of scale and (geographic) markets rather than product attributes. These
examples are prototypical because they unquestionably involve first order change, given the
definition of the zero level, and it is equally beyond question that they are highly patterned and
“routine” in many respects. Given the terminological framework under construction here, these
examples are a conclusive answer to anyone who doubts the “existence” of dynamic capabilities.
(Of course, their doubts may relate to a different understanding of “dynamic capability.”)
It is worth noting that the “zero level” is only locally defined. For a firm that does its
own R&D, the producing and selling the product is zero order activity. For an independent R&D
lab, developing new products is zero order activity.
There are many ways to change. It is quite possible to change without having a dynamic
capability. To begin with, change often occurs by force majeure from the environment,
predictably or not, for better or worse. Whether it is because such an external challenge arrives
or because an autonomous decision to change is made at a high level, organizations often have to
cope with problems they are not well prepared for. They may be pushed into “fire fighting”
mode, a high-paced, contingent, opportunistic and perhaps creative search for satisfactory
alternative behaviors. It is useful to have a name for the category of such change behaviors that
do not depend on dynamic capabilities – behavior that are largely non-repetitive and at least
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“intendedly rationa l” and not merely reactive or passive. I propose “ad hoc problem-solving”.
Ad hoc problem solving is not routine; in particular, not highly patterned and not repetitious. As
suggested above, it typically appears as a response to novel challenges from the environment or
other relatively unpredictable events. Thus, ad hoc problem solving and the exercise of dynamic
capabilities are two different ways to change – or two categories comprising numerous different
ways to change.
Of course, close study of a series of “fires” may well reveal that there is pattern even in
“fire fighting.” Some of the pattern may be learned and contribute positively to effectiveness,
and in that sense be akin to a skill or routine. In organizational improvisation, as in jazz, creative
achievement typically rises from a foundation of patterned and practiced performance, a fund of
micro-patterns that are recombined and sequenced in creative ways (Miner, Bassoff and
Moorman 2001). Responses to highly dynamic environments may also be patterned at a higher
level, guided by adherence to relatively simple rules and structural principles (Eisenhardt and
Martin 2000). At the other end of the spectrum, even the most incremental effort at product
modification can run into unexpected snags that are beyond the scope of the dynamic capability,
and require a complementary dose of ad hoc problem solving. To acknowledge these points is
not, however, to concede that there is no difference between dynamic capabilities and ad hoc
problem solving; to say that would be to indulge in the “shades of gray” fallacy. For the
concepts and the contrast to be useful aids to understanding, it is not necessary that the pure
forms exist in the world, or even that we have high “inter-rater reliability” in sorting real cases
into only two conceptual boxes.
Contrasting cost structures. Dynamic capabilities typically involve long-term
commitments to specialized resources. The more pervasive and detailed the patterning of the
activity involved, the higher the costs of the commitments tend to be. The ability to sustain a
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particular patterned approach to new product development, for example, depends to some extent
on continuity in the engineering personnel involved; there may be substantial continuity in
facilities and equipment as well. Similarly, an established replicator organization has a central
staff that is the locus of its ability to bring together real estate, design skills, construction,
equipment and furnishings, advertising campaigns, new employees, etc., and create a new outlet.
The size of that central capability determines the pace at which new outlets can be opened. For
these sorts of commitments to be economically sound, the capability must be exercised: to have a
dynamic capability and find no occasion for change is merely to carry a cost burden. On the
other hand, an aggressive search for such occasions may also be a mistake. Attempting too much
change – perhaps in a deliberate effort to exercise the dynamic capability – can impose
additional costs when the frequent disruption of the underlying capability outweighs the
competitive value of the novelty achieved. There is an ecological demand for balance between
the costs of the capability and the use that is actually made of it.
By contrast, the costs of ad hoc problem solving largely disappear if there is no problem
to solve. Many of those costs take the form of opportunity costs of personnel who have
alternative productive roles in the (zero level) capability. True, it is conceivable that a similar
pattern could obtain in an organization that had dynamic capabilities. This would mean that
people could step out of their zero-level roles and into their dynamic capability roles – their
learned, patterned change roles – and then step back again when change was completed. The
plausibility of this image is undercut by the “rustiness” problem: successful maintenance of a
skill or routine typically requires frequent exercise. Regardless of whether that objection is
decisive in itself, it seems that, in practice, prominent examples of dynamic capabilities generally
involve a lot of specialized personnel who are committed full time to their change roles, and
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other types of investments as well. The contrast with the lighter cost burdens of ad hoc problem
solving is clear.
No “rule for riches” here. It should now be apparent that it is not necessarily
advantageous for a firm to invest in (first order) dynamic capabilities. Rivals who rely on ad hoc
problem- solving to accomplish change when needed are carrying a lower cost burden. If
opportunities for competitively significant change are sparse enough or expensive enough to
realize, then the added cost of dynamic capabilities will not be matched by corresponding
benefits on the average – even if an occasional notable success might suggest the contrary. Also,
if the change environment does sustain dynamic capabilities relative to ordinary capabilities
(plus ad hoc problem-solving), competition among many firms pursuing a similar dynamic
capabilities strategy may compete away the rents, because (e.g.) product markets are saturated
with rival innovations or because the salaries of scientists and engineers are bid up. A related
and long-familiar example of a disadvantageous dynamic capability is innovative R&D that does
not pay off in the presence of strong rivals who invest only in imitative R&D (See, e.g., Nelson
and Winter 1982.) The (descriptive) rule for riches is to occupy a favored and relatively uncontested place in the ecology of behaviors – for example, by having a strong R&D unit when
others in the industry lack both innovative and imitative capabilities. While an individual actor
can exert some influence on that ecology, it may well have difficulty in identifying the favored
and uncontested niches, or in forestalling unfavorable change after such a niche has been
exploited for a while. Hence, the rule is of little prescriptive value.
Higher order capabilities. If exogenous change is “competence destroying” at the level of
first order dynamic capabilities, those who invest in routinizing the response to familiar types of
change may find themselves disadvantaged relative to more flexible players who have invested
in higher order capabilities. Deliberate investments in organizational learning may, for example,
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facilitate the creation and modification of dynamic capabilities for the management of
acquisitions or alliance (Zollo and Winter 2002). Collis (1994) argues that the existence of
higher order capabilities provides a rebuttal to any claim that there is generally advantage to be
had from strength at any particular level of dynamic capability: there is always a higher level,
and in his view superiority at the higher level always “trumps” superiority at a lower level. Here,
the same skeptical conclusion about advantage rests on the alternative argument that ad hoc
problem solving is always a substitute for dynamic capability and may be economically superior.
Collis also makes, however, the related interesting suggestion that there is a historical tendency
for the locus of competitive action to rise in the capability hierarchy. Strategic innovation often
involves “changing the game” in a way that “takes it to a higher level” – a phrase that often
connotes a focus on strengthening higher order change capabilities. This notion appeals at the
descriptive level and there is clearly some logic to it. Knowledge advances cumulatively,
imitation spreads solutions around, and problems that are visible, urgent and recur at high
frequency tend to get solved before problems with the opposite attributes. But these
considerations do not suffice to make the progression to a higher “order” of competition a logical
necessity, since the levels differ in the cost-benefit bala nce of capability investments, and
exogenous change could at any time tip an existing balance in favor of lower order capabilities
supplemented by ad hoc problem solving. The argument for such upward progression is
therefore missing an appropriate assumption that restricts the character of exogenous change in
such a way as to assure that the investment in higher order capabilities tends to pay off, while the
cost-cutting move in the opposite direction does not. Just how such an assumption might be
framed is unclear, but the logic is incomplete without it.
Reprise. Probably some of the mystery and confusion surrounding the concept of
dynamic capability arises from linking the concept too tightly to notions of generalized
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effectiveness at dealing with change and generic formulas for sustainable competitive advantage.
The argument here is that clarity is served by breaking this linkage. There is no way to hedge
against every contingency. There is no general rule for riches. That investing in dynamic
capabilities (of whatever order) can be a partial hedge against the obsolescence of existing
capability, and can sometimes yield relatively sustainable advantage, is obvious from the nature
of “dynamic capability,” as defined here. That this cannot be uniformly or inevitably
advantageous is equally obvious, from the meaning of “investing”: the thought experiment of
raising the costs while holding the gross benefits constant makes the net benefit disappear, and
certainly the world is capable of turning such a thought experiment into a real experiment. The
concept of dynamic capability is a helpful addition to the tool kit of strategic analysis, but
strategic analysis itself remains a matter of understanding how the idiosyncratic attributes of the
individual firm affect its prospects in a particular competitive context.
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